Correlation Between Corruption and Education in Developing Countries by De La Cruz Aquino, Nathalie
Printing:
This	poster	is	48”	wide	by	36”	high.	
It’s	designed	to	be	printed	on	a	
large
Customizing	the	Content:
The	placeholders	in	this	
formatted	for	you.	
placeholders	to	add	text,	or	click	
an	icon	to	add	a	table,	chart,	
SmartArt	graphic,	picture	or	
multimedia	file.
T
from	text,	just	click	the	Bullets	
button	on	the	Home	tab.
If	you	need	more	placeholders	for	
titles,	
make	a	copy	of	what	you	need	and	
drag	it	into	place.	PowerPoint’s	
Smart	Guides	will	help	you	align	it	
with	everything	else.
Want	to	use	your	own	pictures	
instead	of	ours?	No	problem!	Just	
right
Change	Picture.	Maintain	the	
proportion	of	pictures	as	you	resize	
by	dragging	a	corner.
Correlation	Between	Corruption	and	Education	in	
Developing	CountriesBy	Nathalie	De	La	Cruz	Aquino,	Department	of	Applied	EconomicsMentor:	Devon	Gorry,	Department	of	Economics	and	Finance
ABSTRACT
• Cross-country empirical studies that analyze the relationship between corruptionperception and education indicators are abundant. In this study, I use the PISA outcomes toproxy for education quality as well as other education indicators and regress them withtwo different corruption measures and control variables. Running GLS on the standardizedmean values of the PISA results shows that lower corruption is associated with an increasein the PISA scores for math (0.23 σ), science (0.20 σ), and reading (0.29 σ) acrosscountries; however, these coefficients are not statistically significant after controlling forfixed effects and other control variables. Dropout rates show a stronger relationship (-3.15). In addition, I use other educational indicators such as enrollment and schoolingyears to study the effect of corruption in the access to education and human capital stock.Using interactions in my regressions show worse PISA outcomes for developing countriesin general.BACKGROUND
• Dridi 2014 compiled a literature review of similar empirical studies. Education quality isconstantly measured by repeater or dropout rates, access to education through enrollmentrates, and human capital stock through schooling years.
• TI’s Global Corruption Report on Education in 2013 presented case studies from differentcountries. “Corruption in education is an extra burden on the poor.” Then, developingcountries suffer more deeply from the effect of corruption in education. The non-transparent nature of corruption makes it hard to measure it.
• Corruption perception is a good measure of corruption. The lack of resources thatcorruption carries over are correlated with public discontent (CHR. Michelsen Institute2006, Smith 2008).
• Country case studies also exist that study corruption within the sector of educationspecifically. PETS: shown negative consequences of embezzlement of resources ineducation (Ferraz et al, 2014).
• The D.R. ended up with the worst score among the countries in the PISA 2015examinations. A 70.7% fell into the lowest achievers! (PISA, 2015). Around 4.4% of the GDPis being spent in education; also, lots of construction of schools and the extension of theschool day period. However, this has not had its desired effect yet.OBJECTIVES
• Study the relationship between corruption and education quality, human capital stock,and access to education with more recent cross-country data (2003-2015).
• Use a new indicator for education quality: PISA outcomes 2003-2015.
• Investigate whether the effect of corruption in developing countries is larger than indeveloped countries.
• Comment on the Dominican Republic’s PISA outcomes in 2015.METHODS
• Used STATA as my analytical software (thanks to the APEC department!).
• Gathered a panel data set and standardized some variables. Ran tests forheteroskedasticity and adjusted for robust standard errors; the MWD test of functionalforms and Ramsey’s RESET test favored a linear model; and, the Hausman test favored afixed effects model for most of my regressions.
• Ran GLS regressions with country fixed effects and time fixed effects.
• Created interactions in my regressions to investigate whether the effect of corruption ineducation is larger in developing countries.
• My analysis shows that a better governance score is associated with increased scores on the PISA examinationsacross countries; however, they are not significant after controlling for other variables. Education quality (dropoutrate) shows a stronger and more significant relationship with corruption even after controlling for fixed effects andother variables.
• Access to education (enrollment rate) shows a 1.83 increase for a one σ increase in the corruption indicator. Theeffect becomes small and insignificant after controlling for fixed effects and other variables.
• Human capital stock as measured by the mean schooling years does not show a strong relationship with corruption.
• The effect of corruption in developing countries’ education sectors is harsher in the aspects of quality than access,and the accumulation of human capital.
• One of the assumptions I make is that the overall perception of corruption implies that there is also corruption inthe education sector. This may not be true for all cases, so I gathered data from Global Corruption Barometer survey(2004-2013) where people answered to this question: “To what extent do you perceive the following sectors in thiscountry/territory to be affected by corruption?” (1: not at all corrupt, 5: extremely corrupt). This table shows theinteractions of corruption within education in developing countries after controlling for time effects and othervariables:
EMPIRICAL	RESULTS
CONCLUSIONS	&	COMMENTS
• Corruption is associated with worse education quality. I cannot conclude that corruption is highlycorrelated with worse education access and less accumulation of human capital.
• Not clear stronger/weaker effect in developing countries.
• Corruption in general is associated with corruption within the education sector in specific; corruptionwithin the sector is associated with worse qualitative. Cannot conclude the same about quantitativeeducation outcomes.
• Better specifications (2SLS, non-linearities, etc.) and more comparable data across countries areneeded.
• More research needed. Criticism on PISA as outdated exam and small sample. Control for students thattook the test background questions.
• In the D.R., the fact that more resources are being spent in the education sector does not mean that all ofthese resources are being used effectively and honestly. Still, the country needs time to see if the moneywill be translated into better education. More data and research is needed to track the expenditures ineducation and how they are being utilized and managed. A country case study based on surveys such asPETS in Brazil (Ferraz et al, 2014) would shed light on the real situation of education in the D.R.
GLS	on	PISA	Outcomes (Std.	Deviations)
MATH SCIENCE READING
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)WGI	corruption	indicator* 0.230 *** 0.123 0.195 *** 0.066 0.291 *** 0.091(.087) (.12) (.076) (.099) (.110) (.172)Expenditure	in	education	(%		of	GDP) -0.100 ** -0.060 -0.114 **(.04) (.038) (.043)Mortality -0.021 0.0004 -0.038 **(.022) (.013) (.015)GDP	per	capita -0.002 0.001 0.002(.004) (.003) (.004)Constant	 -0.328 * 0.733 ** -0.289 * 0.300 -0.413 ** 0.906 **(.177) (.355) (.174) (.245) (.194) (.372)Country	fixed	effects No Yes No Yes No YesTime	fixed	effects - Yes - Yes - YesObservations 218 155 218 155 217 154R-squared	(overall) 0.379 0.447 0.374 0.100 0.411 0.569
Interaction of	Corruption	in	Developing	Countries𝒀𝒊 = 	𝜶𝒊 +𝜷𝑪𝒊 + 𝜸𝑫𝒊 + 𝜹 𝑪 ∗ 𝑫 𝒊 + 𝜽𝒁𝒊	𝜺𝒊.
Education	
Quality
∂CPI ∂WGIDeveloping Developed Ratio Developing Developed Ratio
∂math .06	+	.416(1)	=	.422 .06	+	.416(0)	=	.06 7.0 .151	+	.467(1)	=	.618	 .151	+	.467(0)	=	.151 4.1
∂science 0.184	+	.148(1)	=	.332	 0.184	+	.148(0)	=	.148	 2.2 .292	+	.261(1)	=	.553 .292	+	.261(0)	=	.292 1.9
∂reading .012	+	.064(1)	=	.076 .012	+	.064(0)	=	.012 6.3 .099	+	.256(1)	=	.355 .099	+	.256(0)	=	.099 3.6
∂dropout 1.39	- 3.61(1)	=-2.22 1.39	- 3.61(0)	=		1.39 -1.6 1.53	- 1.06(1)	=	.47 1.53	- 1.06(0)	=	1.53 0.3
Access	to	
Education
∂enrollment .367	- 3.52(1)		=-3.15 .367	- 3.52(0)		=	.367 -8.6 -0.321	- 1.69*(1)	=	-2.01 -0.321	- 1.69*(0)	=-0.321 6.3
Human	Capital	
Stock
∂schooling -.083	+	.456(1)	=	0.373 -.083	+	.456(0)	=-.083 -4.5 -.008	- .148(1)	=	-.156 -.008	- .148(1)	=-.008 19.5
Global	Corruption	Barometer	Surveys	
Perception	of	Corruption	within	the	sector	of	Education
(After	controlling	for	other	variables,	no	fixed	effects)
Developed Developing
y	=	dropout 2.99 1.38
y	=	enrollment -0.672 -0.749
y	=	schooling -0.26 0.174
DISCUSSION
*Increase	in	one	σ in	the	WGImeans	less corruption.
GLS	on	Education	Indicators
(Quality,	Access,	and	Human	Capital	Stock)
Dropout	(%) Enrollment	(%) Schooling	(years)
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)WGI	corruption	indicator* -4.671 *** -3.15 * 1.83 ** -0.48 0.259 -0.037(.926) (1.67) (.815) (.897) (.232) (.118)Mortality -0.13 *** -0.28 *** -0.013(.044) (.041) (.008)GDP	per	capita 0.02 -0.004 0.001(.049) (.029) (.004)Constant	 13.77 *** 19.97 *** 90.12 *** 101.8 *** 8.796 *** 9.014 ***(.907) (2.03) (.892) (1.7) (.274) (.366)Country	fixed	effects No Yes No Yes No YesTime	fixed	effects - Yes - Yes - YesObservations 1071 1039 1441 1416 430 419R-squared	(overall) 0.123 0.143 0.137 0.598 0.362 0.323
